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Article 3

ARTICLES

THE STATE OF THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE
ALAN

B. ROSENTHAL*

A humorist once suggested that most states were so ashamed
of their legislatures that they hid their lawmakers in backwater
towns like Albany, Sacramento, and Tallahassee. While state
legislatures are still relatively obscure, they have undergone a
metamorphosis in recent years. In this Article, ProfessorRosenthal appraises the FloridaLegislature, based on observations he
made as a scholar-in-residenceduring the 1986 Regular -Session.
One of the nation's leading students of lawmaking, he found
much to commend, but much to improve upon in this institution
where both the noblest and basest impulses of human nature
come out into the open.

S

TATE governments are presently experiencing a renaissance.
State capitols are where the action is. States are taking on new
problems and playing a new role in our federal system. The recent
Reagan Revolution, which has encouraged state initiatives through
political devolutionary measures,' is partly responsible for the resurgence of the states. Moreover, diminished southern exceptionalism, along with the region's acquiescence to integration, has promoted the legitimacy of all the states. Economically, the nation's
strong recovery from the 1981-82 recession also has been a factor.2
Underlying these developments was the transformation of state
governments "in almost every facet of their structure and opera*

Director, Eagleton Institute of Politics, and Professor of Political Science, Rutgers

University. A.B., 1953, Harvard University; M.P.A., 1958, M.A., 1958, Ph.D., 1961, Princeton
University.
I spent the spring of 1986 in Tallahassee observing the Florida Legislature at close hand.
Some of the material in this Article derives from my observations during the days I spent
with legislators, legislative staff, and the Governor and his staff.
1. These devolutionary measures, which were intended to shift power and responsibility
from the federal government to the states, included cuts and changes in the Aid to Families'
with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamp programs as well as the conversion of many categorical programs into block grants.
2. R. Nathan, America's Changing Federalism 6-7 (Mar. 18, 1986) (unpublished manu-

script chapter for

AMERICAN ENTER. INST., THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (rev.

ed.)).
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tions." Over the past twenty-five years, state governments have
become more modern and have developed the managerial and
technical capacity to assume new and expanded functions.4 This
era of modernization included change in both the executive and
judicial branches, but it was the legislature more than any other
governmental institution that underwent a radical transformation.
Perhaps state legislatures made the greatest strides because,
twenty-five years ago, they had farthest to go. They were nineteenth-century institutions, ill-adapted to governance in the twentieth century., Since the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Baker v. Carr 6 and the flurry of reapportionment that ensued,
legislatures across the nation have changed. They now are truly
"the first branch of government," thoroughly revitalized, with the
capacity and will to govern.'
Few legislatures have changed as dramatically as has Florida's,
once an institution dominated by rural legislators 8 but now a modern, democratic, and representative body. The purpose of this Article is to examine the condition of the Florida Legislature and compare it to other legislatures in terms of decision-making capacity,
the shape of the membership, the game of legislative politics, the
exercise of power, the nature of the lawmaking process, and the
quality of legislative performance.
I.

THE EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY

Commentators believe that "enhanced capacity" accounts for
the revival of state legislatures and their well-being today. New
facilities, such as computers and other equipment, have increased
the availability of information. Organizational and structural
changes, professional staffing, and longer sessions also have increased capacity. So has the expansion of work in the interim between sessions. While capacity is probably requisite, it is by no
3.
BILITY

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF STATE CAPA-

A-98 (1985).

4.

R. Nathan, supra note 2, at 7.

5.

Heard, Introduction-Old Problem, New Context, in

STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERI-

CAN POLITICS 3 (1966).

6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding malapportionment of the Tennessee Legislature a justiciable claim under fourteenth amendment).
7. See Pound, Reinventing the Legislature, STATE LEGISLATURES, July, 1986, at 16-20.
8. Skene, Reapportionment in Florida, in THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1985-86, at 131-40
(A. Morris ed. 1985).
9.
CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, THE SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS 36-47
(1971).
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means all that is required for institutional well-being. Capacity is
not a linear function. More elaborate facilities, longer time spent in
session, or a larger staff do not necessarily mean a better legislature. It is conceivable, in fact, that abundant capacity may be used
only modestly by one legislature while a smaller capacity may be
exploited fully by another.
A.

Capacity as a Function of Brick and Mortar

Among the elements of capacity, facilities are most visible and
obvious. The Florida Legislature is second to none in this respect.
Florida's facilities offer legislators an environment that is conducive to the conduct of their work. Although some members make
aesthetic objections to the architectural style of the Capitol and
legislative office buildings in Tallahassee, the physical arrangements are functional and modern. In part because of their facilities, legislators work diligently and effectively.
B. Having Enough Time and Using it Wisely
Time is another element of capacity. Legislatures across the
country now spend more time than they did before in session or
engaged in interim work. In 1962, for example, twenty legislatures,
including Florida's, met biennially. Today, the Florida Legislature,
like those of forty-two other states, meets annually."o The regular
session in Florida, like those in thirty-one other states, is constitutionally limited. 1 Florida's session runs for sixty calendar days,
starting in early April. As in most states where sessions are limited
to a certain number of calendar or legislative days,1" the time
available for productive work in Florida has been expanded because the amount of activity in the interim between regular sessions has increased markedly. In even-numbered years, the legislature organizes just after the November general election, and
members spend three or four days each month during the interim
in committee meetings, preparing for the session. In odd-numbered
years, interim meetings are held throughout the fall and winter.
10. The seven states that still meet biennially are Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas. 26 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 83-86 (1986-87 ed.) [hereinafter cited as BOOK OF THE STATES].
11.

Id.

12. Several state legislatures have constitutionally limited sessions. While the length varies from state to state, the range is usually between 30 and 90 calendar days. Id.
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Thus, the Florida Legislature accomplishes the business of one of
the nation's largest states in relatively little time.
An issue confronting most legislatures today is not whether more
time is needed, but rather how the best use can be made of the
time already committed. The Florida Legislature seems to make
good use of its time, but it could be more efficient. At the start of
the session, nearly all of the time is spent in committee meetings.
Midway through the session, the House and Senate convene two or
three mornings a week. With a few weeks to go, members spend
about half of each day on the floor and by the last week they are
on the floor most of their working time. Most legislators only
spend about forty days of the sixty-day session at the Capitol, normally arriving in Tallahassee on Monday morning and leaving by
Thursday evening or Friday afternoon. Nevertheless, it is politically necessary for some controversial issues-most notably the appropriations bill-to be deferred until the last days, when the pressure for decision is most intense. Even so, the Florida Legislature
tends to postpone too many important issues until the final days or
even the final hours, making for needless confusion and hectic activity as members scramble to finish their business."3
C.

Staff Support as an Enhancement of Capacity

More than any other factor, the expansion of professional staffing has contributed to capacity. Estimates now are that more than
16,000 full-time, year-round staff members are working for the nation's legislatures. Another 10,000 are added during the course of
legislative sessions. While a few legislatures have small staffs, most
have from 50 to 300 professional employees.1 4 Florida is among
those states with 400 or more professionals on its legislative
payroll.
As of May 1986, the Florida Legislature employed 892 people in
permanent, year-round positions, with 239 in the Senate, 478 in
the House, and the rest in other legislative offices.1 5 These include
13. The journals of the Senate and the House are one measure of activity. In 1986, out of
1,251 pages in the Senate Journal,690 reflected activity during the last four days and 482
pages were for the final day. Out of 1,476 pages in the House Journal,763 were for the last
four days and 438 were for the final day.
14. California, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas are included in this group.
See L. SIMON, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO STAFFING PATTERNS 43 (1979).
15. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Admin. Servs., Legislative Personnel
Monthly Report (May 1986) (on file with committee). These figures exclude the Office of the
Auditor General, technically a legislative agency, which employed 556 persons. Id.
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professional, administrative, and clerical employees. First are the
members' aides and secretaries, who perform constituent services
and help with the legislators' own bills. For ten months of the year
they work in district offices, and for the nine weeks of the session
most move to Tallahassee. Second are the staffs of the Secretary of
the Senate, the Clerk of the House, and the Sergeants at Arms of
each chamber. They are responsible for bills, calendars, journals,
and other documents and records of legislative action. Third are
the staffs of the Senate President and House Speaker-the executive directors, policy directors, and counsels-and of the majority
and minority offices. Fourth are the centralized staffs of the Joint
Legislative Management Committee in the divisions of Administrative Services, Economic and Demographic Research, Legislative
Information, Legislative Library, and Statutory Revision.
Especially important are the eighty-two persons who work for
the sixteen standing committees of the Senate and 152 persons
who work for the twenty-four standing committees of the House.
These staffs are at the heart of the policy process. They not only
conduct research and produce reports during the interim and analyze bills during the session, they also participate in setting committee agendas, devising committee strategies, exploring policy options, communicating political and substantive information,
working to reduce conflict, and negotiating agreements. Even
though political considerations count heavily, the accurate, timely,
and compelling information provided by staff always plays a role in
the lawmaking process. Committee staffs are highly qualified, and
none more so than the Senate and House Appropriations staffs. In
general, these staffs have considerable discretion; yet they are responsive to the chairmen of the committees and subcommittees for
which they work.
While staffers provide some stability in a highly political institution that suffers from a lack of continuity, they remain subject to
the control of legislators, primarily the leaders. The situation is far
from perfect. Anxiety among committee staffs-particularly in the
House-peaks every two years when the leadership changes and
jobs are in peril. Furthermore, management by legislative leaders,
who are preoccupied with more pressing matters, leaves much to
be desired, as it does in nearly every legislature. 6 Despite these
16.

See, e.g.,

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REVIEW OF THE FLORIDA

JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

16-33 (1986).
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institutional shortcomings, the staff of the Florida Legislature
ranks second to none.
II.

THE SHAPE OF LEGISLATIVE MEMBERSHIP

More crucial than the capacity of a legislature is its membership.
The composition of the nation's legislatures has changed dramatically during the past twenty years, mainly as a result of reapportionment. Nowhere has reapportionment had as marked an impact
as in Florida, where new urban legislators wrested control from rural "porkchoppers.' 1 7 The post-reapportionment elections of 1966
brought in a number of outstanding progressives, and the subsequent blending of new and seasoned members proved a potent
combination.
As described by one leader of that generation:
[T]hese were new faces thrust into an old institution, without
ties-no ties to the leadership, no ties to the lobbyists, no ties to
the old cabinet officers who had been there from time immemorial. They were brand new on the scene and they felt they were
taking a fresh look at the institutions [of government],18
These newcomers acquired power and learned to use it, working
successfully to modernize the legislature, the executive branch, and
the judiciary.
A.

Racial and Ethnic Minorities and Women

Since the days of rural dominance, the composition of state legislatures, including Florida's, has been shifting. Minorities have
more representation than before. By July 1984, 385 of the nation's
state legislators were black, 5.3% of the total. 19 This is a modest
gain from a decade earlier when blacks comprised 3 % of all legislators. In Florida, the first black member since 1889 was elected to
the House in 1968. Since then the numbers have increased to 4 in
1978-80, 5 in 1980-82, and 10 in 1982-84 and 1984-86.20 Only 2 of
17. See Skene, supra note 8, at 133-34.
18. Remarks of Richard A. Pettigrew, Florida Senate Seminar, Legislative Reform in
Historic Context, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Jan. 11, 1985) (unedited transcript) (on file
with Senate President's office).
19. A. ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE 30 (1981); JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES,
BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER 1984, at 17-18 (1984).
20. Fla. H.R., Office of the Clerk, Characteristics of Members, Florida Legislature-1984-86 (n.d.) (on file with Clerk).
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the 40 senators are black, so that presently 12 of the 160 members
of the legislature, or 7.5%, are black. Most recently, Hispanics
have won representation; eight served in the House in 1986.
Women also have made substantial gains, in Florida and
throughout the nation. Nationally the number of women legislators
increased from 301 in 1969, or 4.0% of the total, to 1,101 in 1986,
or 14.8% of the total.2 1 The number of women in the Florida Legislature increased during this same period from two to twenty-two
in the House and from one to nine in the Senate. 2 In 1986, 18.3%
of the House and 22.5% of the Senate were women. Blacks and
Hispanics in the House and women in both chambers have had
major impacts on the issues that received attention. Moreover, the
presence of a significant number of women in the Florida Senate
has changed its atmosphere and style.
B.

Where Have All the Lawyers Gone?

Another shift in the composition of legislatures has been occupational. No longer do lawyers predominate.23 Increased demands on
legislators' time and conflict of interest and financial disclosure requirements2 4 have taken their toll. Although still the largest occupational grouping, lawyers have declined from 30% of the membership of American legislatures in 1960 to only 16% in 1986.5
Time demands also have affected farmers, who once accounted for
22% of the nation's legislators but comprise only 10% today.
Teachers at the elementary, secondary, and higher education levels
have increased their representation in legislatures more than any
other group, increasing from only 3% of the states' lawmakers in
1966 to 8% today.
Florida has a slightly higher proportion of attorneys than the average legislature-30 % in the Senate and 22.5% in the House.
But, as in the nation as a whole, the proportion of lawyer legislators has declined in Florida, from 39% in 1969-70 to 26% in 197921. Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Inst. of Politics, Women in
State Legislatures 1986 (Apr. 1986) (fact sheet).
22. Fla. H.R., Office of the Clerk, Number of Women Members of the Florida Legislature since 1929 (nd.) (on file with Clerk).
23. Gerrity, The Changing Profile of State Legislature and Legislators (1960-1981),
STATE LINE, Aug., 1981, at 7.
24. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; id. art. III.
25. Gerrity, supra note 23, at 7; Rosenthal, The State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HOPSTRA L. REV. 1185, 1193 (1983); National Conference of State Legislatures, Survey of Legislators' Occupations (1986) (unpublished report).
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80. Since then, however, that proportion has been relatively stable
and currently averages 24% .2
C.

The Citizen Legislature-Hangingin the Balance

One of the most significant changes in the composition of many
legislatures has been the movement from "citizen" to "professional" legislators.17 Generally, the citizen legislator has an occupation or substantial interests outside the legislature. The professional, however, is usually someone who has no other significant
occupation and little time or interest for anything but politics.
How someone defines himself and the amount of time spent on the
job as a legislator are the chief distinguishing criteria for the two
breeds.
Twenty years ago, a few California legislators described themselves occupationally as "legislators" in their state directory biographical sketch. Now, significant proportions of the members in
several states consider themselves full-time legislators, and even
larger proportions consider themselves almost full time. 28 This
trend is prevalent in large states like California and New York as
well as in smaller states, such as Wisconsin, Arizona, and Iowa.
Florida still has a citizen legislature. In 1984-86, only fourteen
members defined their occupation as "legislator."2 9 But a number
of other members, however they characterized their occupations,
pursued little else besides the legislature and politics. One reason
that Florida has been able to preserve its citizen legislature is that,
with constitutionally limited sessions of sixty days, members do
not have to spend an inordinate amount of time away from outside
jobs. But over the years their time commitments have increased
due to interim work, service on advisory boards, joint committees
and commissions, attendance at meetings of national and regional
organizations, and, in particular, work in district offices and on
constituent affairs. Some years ago, for example, it was estimated
that on average a senator spent approximately 200 days a year on
26. Fla. H.R., Office of the Clerk, Attorneys in the Florida Legislature-1929-1986 (n.d.)
(on file with Clerk).
27. See Rosenthal, The Changing Characterof State Legislators-Or: Requiem for a
Vanishing Breed, 6 PUB. AFF. REv. 80-93 (1985). See generally Paterson, Is the Citizen LegislatorBecoming Extinct?, STATE LEGISLATURES, July, 1986, at 22-25; and Citizen-legislators
finding you can't have it both ways, The Evening Sun (Baltimore), July 2, 1986, at A14, col.
1.
28. Paterson, supra note 27, at 22-25.
29. See FLA. H.R., OFFICE OF THE CLERK, CLERK'S MANUAL 1984-86 passim.
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the legislative job. 0 It is doubtful that most senators spend substantially less today.
Another reason for the preservation of the citizen legislature in
Florida is the level of legislative salaries. In a number of states salaries have increased markedly-to $43,000 in New York, $33,732 in
California, $35,000 in Pennsylvania, $36,520 in Michigan, and
$32,500 in Illinois.' These salaries provide members with income
that compensates them-adequately if not munificently-for the
time they spend on the legislature. Wisconsin, for instance, pays its
legislators $27,200, which provides about three-quarters of the total income of the average member.3 2 In Florida, the salary was only
$12,000 until recently. It had remained at this low level since 1969,
when it was raised from a mere $1,200. The low salary made it
impossible for many members to devote full time to the legislature.
In 1985, however, legislators voted themselves a pay raise and provided that their salaries would increase automatically every year
by the same percentage that the average salary of state employees
rose during the preceding year. 3 An attempt to repeal the automatic pay-raise provision failed in 1986. 34 Considering this improved remuneration, as well as the increased time demands, it appears the Florida Legislature will have a larger proportion of
relatively full-time, professional members in the years ahead.
D. The Quality of the Members
The full-time/part-time status, vocation, race, and sex of the
membership are not as important as its overall quality. Observers
of the Florida scene point to the late 1960's and early 1970's as a
"golden age," when legislators of extraordinary quality assumed
power after the revolution brought on by reapportionment. Many
of those members-Louis de la Parte,35 Terrell Sessums,3 6 Murray
'
Dubbin, 37 Bob Graham,"8 George Firestone,39 Fred Schultz,40
Tal30. Fla. S., Office of the President, Estimated Time Spent by Legislators on Official or
Constituent Business (July 27, 1979) (on file with Senate President's office).
31. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 10, at 95-97.
32. Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 85.
33. Ch. 85-322, § 8, 1985 Fla. Laws 1953, 1957 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.13 (1985)).
34.

BILLS
32.
35.
36.
37.

FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION,

1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE

at 41, SB 85; id., SB 91; id. at 123, SB 691; id., HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 204, HB
Rep., Dem., Tampa, 1963-1965; Sen. 1966-1974.
Rep., Dem., Tampa, 1963-1974.
Rep., Dem., Miami, 1963-1974.
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bot D'Alemberte, 4 ' Lawton Chiles, ' Kenneth H. MacKay,43 Marshall Harris, 4 Reubin Askew, 5 Robert L. Shevin,4 s and Richard A.
Pettigrew,4' 7 among others-were outstanding lawmakers. They elevated the performance of the legislature to noteworthy heights.
Members of the House first elected in 1972 and 1974, especially
Hyatt Brown,' 8 Ralph H. Haben, 49 Herb Morgan,50 Steve Pajcic,5 1
H. Lee Moffitt, 52 Samuel P. Bell, 53 Elaine Gordon, 54 James Harold

Thompson,55 Frank Mann, 58 and Betty Easley, 7 are thought by
many observers to constitute a "second golden age" of the Florida
Legislature. This group achieved its greatest power in 1978 and
continues to hold it today. The ranks of the "second golden age"
are thinning, however, and new members will soon be taking over.
Perhaps the quality of legislative membership is diminishing in
Florida and in many other states. In Florida there had been a major improvement from the "porkchopper" generation and a less
perceptible change in the years since. Now, however, a gradual decline may be underway. One reason is financial disclosure requirements, which discourage successful business executives and attorneys from seeking office. 58 Another reason is the national trend
toward single-member districts,59 which became the exclusive
38. Rep., Dem., Miami Lakes, 1966-1970; Sen., 1970-78; Governor, 1979; United
States Senator-elect, 1986.
39. Rep., Dem., Miami, 1966-1972; Sen., 1972-1978; Secretary of State, 197940. Rep., Dem., Jacksonville, 1963-1970.
41. Rep., Dem., Miami, 1966-1972.
42. Rep., Dem., Lakeland, 1958-1966; Sen., 1966-1970; United States Senator, 197143. Rep., Dem., Ocala, 1968-1974; Sen., 1974-1980; Member of Congress, 198344. Rep., Dem., Miami, 1966-1974.
45. Rep., Dem., Pensacola, 1958-1961; Sen., 1962-1970; Governor, 1971-1979; United
States Trade Representative, 1979-1981.
46. Rep., Dem., Miami, 1964-1966; Sen., 1966-1970; Attorney General, 1971-1979.
47. Rep., Dem., Miami, 1963-1972; Sen., 1972-1974; Special Assistant to the President
for Governmental Regoranization, 1977-1980.
48. Rep., Dem., Ormond Beach, 1972-1980.
49. Rep., Dem., Palmetto, 1972-1982.
50. Rep., Dem., Tallahassee, 1974-1986.
51. Rep., Dem., Jacksonville, 1974-1985; Democratic Nominee for Governor, 1986.
52. Rep., Dem., Tampa, 1974-1984.
53. Rep., Dem., Ormond Beach.
54. Rep., Dem., Miami.
55. Rep., Dem., Quincy, 1974-1986.
56. Rep., Dem., Ft. Myers, 1974-1982; Sen., 1982-1986; Democratic Nominee for Lieutenant Governor, 1986.
57. Rep., Repub., Largo, 1972-1986.
58. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; id. art. III, § 18.
59. In the 1950's, only nine states elected all of their legislators from single-member districts. As of 1984, 34 states did so. See Niemi, Hill & Grofman, The Impact of Multimember
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method of apportionment in Florida in 1982. Previously, the House
had five six-member, six five-member, five four-member, three
three-member, five two-member, and twenty-one single-member
districts under the 1972 districting plan. 0 The Senate had seven
three-member, seven two-member, and five single-member districts. Prior to 1972, Dade County had as many as twenty-one
members in a multi-member district delegation.
As a result of single-member districts and other factors, the national trend is toward more self-interested and parochial legislators. As legislative pay rises and more full-time professionals enter
legislative ranks, this trend is likely to be reinforced. Consensus
will be more difficult to build and the legislative process will be
harder to manage. At the present time, however, the quality of
Florida's legislative membership ranks high in comparison with
other states. The legislature continues to attract talent; it just
takes time for that talent to develop. The classes of 1972 and 1974,
whose talent was not recognized until years later, has apparently
established the standard for the future.
III. THE GAME OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
In recent years state legislatures have become increasingly
politicized, with members paying more and more attention to impending elections. When one election is over, legislators begin
thinking about the next one. The campaign never really ends.
A.

The Advantages of Incumbency

Contemporary legislators want to remain in the legislature for
more than one or two terms. They are not dabblers, nor are they
driven by a sense of noblesse oblige. They are interested in public
office, and they want to advance their political careers as far as
possible. Hence their preoccupation with elections. A recent study
showed that twenty-one of forty-three Indiana and Missouri representatives who left voluntarily sought another elective office. One
who ran for Congress probably spoke for a large number when he
explained that he wanted to either "get in" politics full-time as a
member of Congress, or "get out" and devote himself to his busiDistrictson Party Representationin U.S. State Legislatures, 10 LEGIS.
(1985).
60. Fla. SJR 1305, 1972 Fla. Laws 1633.

STUD.

Q. 441,

443-46
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ness6 1 Another study, which focused on Indiana from 1958 to 1984,
found that a smaller percentage of incumbents were retiring voluntarily while the same number retired to seek higher office."2 Some
legislators leave as soon as they have a shot at higher office; some
wait longer; others settle down after they move from the house to
63
the senate; and still others burn out and get out.
As in other states where the job of lawmaking has become more
attractive, Florida legislators are attempting to remain in office or
move to other elected positions. In the Florida House, for example,
from 1968 through 1984, of 120 members, the number of incumbents either running for re-election or for other office ranged from
103 to 117.64 The percentage ranged from 86.6 in 1972 to 97.5 in
1984 and has not fallen below 93.3 since 1978. In the Senate the
pattern is similar. From 1974 through 1984, the percentage either
running for re-election or for other office ranged from 80 to 95.65
Incumbents who attempt to regain their seats enjoy a "spectacular" success rate. 66 On average, 81 % of incumbents seek re-election,67 and the overwhelming majority of them are successful. In
Florida, the success rate of incumbents is high, but higher in the
House than in the Senate. From 1968 through 1984, the success
rate for incumbents running for the House ranged from 82% to
95% compared to a 71% to 95% success rate for incumbents running for the Senate in the years 1974 through 1984.8 In the 1984
elections, 115 of 120 members in the House ran for re-election, two
ran for higher office and three resigned voluntarily. Of those incumbents who sought re-election, 93% succeeded. Of the twenty
members up for re-election in the Senate, one chose not to run and
one was defeated.
This trend is exacerbated by the fact that legislative districts are
becoming less competitive. 9 The less competitive the district, the
61. Francis & Baker, Why Do U.S. State Legislators Vacate Their Seats?, 11 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 119, 122-23 (1986).
62. See Simon, The Mighty Incumbent, STATE LEGISLATURES, July, 1986, at 31-32.
63. See Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 87-89.
64. Fla. H.R., Office of the Clerk, Incumbency in the Florida House of Representatives
(n.d.) (on file with Clerk) [hereinafter cited as House Incumbency].
65. Fla. S., Office of the Secretary, Senator Election Data (n.d.) (on file with Secretary)
[hereinafter cited as Senator Data].
66. Morehouse, Legislatures and PoliticalParties, 59 STATE Gov'T 19 (1986).
67. Grau, Competition in State Legislative Primaries,6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 35, 47-53 (1981).
68. Compare House Incumbency, supra note 64, with Senator Data, supra note 65.
69. Paper presented by Harvey J. Tucker and Ronald E. Weber, Electoral Changes in
U.S. States: System Versus Constituency Competition, American Political Science Ass'n Annual Meeting, in New Orleans (Aug. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Tucker and Weber paper].
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happier the incumbent. In Florida, as elsewhere, the objective of
incumbents is to discourage competition and run unopposed. Legislators wait anxiously for the qualifying period in July to see
whether anyone will file to run against them. Members of the
House have been fortunate in this respect. The percentage of incumbents running unopposed in the period from 1968 through
1984 ranged from 12.9 in 1972 and 23.3 in 1982, when reapportionment encouraged competition, to 43.8 in 1976, 43.9 in 1980, 45.6 in
1984, and 46.2 in 1968.70 Senators have had more difficulty. Except
for 1974 and 1984, when about half ran unopposed, roughly three
out of four senators have faced opposition of some kind.
Incumbents are able to discourage or defeat opposition because
their resources are greater. Many of them represent districts that
statistically can be classified as "safe. 7 1 They are safe because
they are made that way by decennial reapportionments that favor
one party or the other or shore up the support of incumbents.
They are safe also because incumbents work effectively to keep
themselves that way. First, incumbents are able to raise the money
necessary for campaigns and ordinarily can outspend those who
challenge them.7 2 In Florida, legislators who succeed in building
big campaign warchests sometimes discourage serious challenges.
When challenges do arise, incumbents spend substantially more
than do their opponents.7 3 Second, incumbents, by virtue of their
legislative office, are in a position to be of help to their constituencies, which gives incumbents another advantage over challengers.
The recent trend in the states has seen the constituent service
function, particulary casework, develop and become stronger. Today members in the senates of eighteen states and the houses of
eleven states have personal aides who foster contacts with constituents.7 4 Ten legislatures provide district offices for their members,
which is a further advantage to incumbents. Florida legislators
70. House Incumbency, supra note 64; Senator Data, supra note 65.
71. However statistically safe they are, legislators tend to run scared. A study of the
Alabama Legislature found that, despite ample evidence of the safety of their districts,
nearly all the legislators said their districts were electorally competitive. Cohen, Perceptions
of Electoral Insecurity Among Members Holding Safe Seats in a U.S. State Legislature, 9
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 365, 366-67 (1984).
72. See, e.g., Jones & Borris, Strategic Contributing in Legislative Campaigns: The
Case of Minnesota, 10 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 89, 93-95 (1985).
73. Giles, & Pritchard, Campaign Expenditures and Legislative Elections in Florida, 10
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 71, 74-77 (1985).
74. Rosenthal, The Consequences of Constituency Service, 59 STATE Gov'T 25, 25-26
(1986); see also Simon, supra note 62, at 31-34.
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have both aides and district offices. Most put in some time each
week during the interim on casework, and some make it almost a
full-time job.
Generally, all members of the Senate and House are attentive to
the needs of their districts and listen to the problems of constituents 5 They introduce local bills to benefit communities in their
districts. They endeavor to get as much money for their districts as
possible from state aid formulas, particularly the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). They seek to have funds for state
programs spent in their districts, and members increasingly insist
on putting "turkeys" (formerly known as "pork" in Florida) for
their districts in the appropriations bill.76 All these activities give

Florida's incumbent legislators a head start in their efforts to be
re-elected.
B.

The Emergence of Partisanship

Despite the advantages of incumbency and the relative safety of
many districts, competition for partisan control of state legislatures is on the rise throughout the country." After suffering a
sharp decline in the post-Watergate years, Republicans are resurgent in the states. As of the 1984 elections, the Republicans had
majorities in thirty-one chambers while the Democrats controlled
sixty-five. Two chambers were tied.7 8 Partisanship is on the rise
not only in legislatures where partisanship has traditionally been
strong, such as Michigan, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. It also is
increasing in places where partisanship has meant little, such as in
7
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Vermont. e
Partisanship is a new and significant phenomenon in Florida.
The number of voters who identify with the Republican Party has
been increasing. Currently, about the same percentage have alle75. The "needs," as members perceive them, range beyond constituent service or
casework as such. The actual extent is described in detail in M. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN
STATE LEGISLATURES

78-102.

76. "Turkeys" are projects, such as civic centers, university buildings, parks, monuments, and bridges, which have not been recommended through the normal executive process, but which are approved by the legislature due to the political influence of a member. A.
MORRIS, THE LANGUAGE OF LAWMAKING IN FLORIDA 80 (10th ed. 1985).
77. See Tucker and Weber paper, supra note 69.
78. See A. ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE 140-41 (1981); BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note
10, at 81, 87.
79. Rosenthal, If the Party's Over, Where's All That Noise Coming From?, 57 STATE
GOV'T 50, 50-54 (1984).
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giances to each major party. 80 Although Democrats still outnumber
Republicans in registration, Florida has the fastest-growing Republican registration in the country.8 The Republican upsurge,
however, has not yet been significantly reflected in the legislative
ranks. There has been a gradual build-up of Republican strength
in the House since 1974 to 36.7% of the membership in 1986. In
the Senate the percentage rose to 32.5 after 1980, then declined
and was 25% in 1986.82
For some years the Republicans have been organized as the minority party in both the Senate and the House, while House Democrats recently established an active majority office. Both the majority and minority parties, under their respective leaders-the
president, president-designate, and minority leader in the Senate
and the speaker, speaker-designate, and minority leader in the
House-devote much of their effort to electoral politics. They work
at re-electing their own members and targeting and defeating the
opposition's most vulnerable incumbents. The President's Fund in
the Senate and the Speaker's Fund in the House are vehicles for
the majority's campaign financing activities. A joint Senate-House
campaign fund is the device used by the Republicans. 3
Despite some partisanship in the electoral activities of legislative
Democrats and Republicans, the Florida Legislature is not really a
partisan place-at least not yet. Relatively few of the issues that
arise are decided along party lines, and few attempts are made by
the minority to make a record and electorally embarrass the majority. In the 1986 Regular Session, however, Republicans did coalesce
and oppose Democrats on a number of bills relating to elections-the Speaker's public financing bill,8 4 election reform provisions,s and the abolition of runoff primaries86-and on a few other
80. The Mason-Dixon Opinion Research Co., which conducts polls for a number of Florida newspapers, reports much higher GOP identification than in the past. Poll: Majority of
Floridiansidentify with Republican Party, Tallahassee Democrat, Apr. 15, 1986, at 1A, col
2.
81. Republicans are making gains, but history is against them, Orlando Sentinel, Mar.
23, 1986, at A-8, col. 1.
82. THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1985-86, at 112 (A. Morris ed. 1985).
83. For information about fund raising by legislative leaders in other states, see Rosenthal, supra note 79, at 52-53.
84. FLA. S. JOUR. 885 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986) (vote on HB 1194).
85. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 955 (Reg. Sess. June 5, 1986) (amendment 2 to HB 256).
86. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 85 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 8, 1986) (HB 884 was defeated in the Ethics and
Elections Committee).
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measures, such as the sunsetting of sales tax exemptions8 7 and several amendments to the appropriations bills.88 Republicans also
stuck together in a number of committees, where their strength
was disproportionate to their number and their attendance more
regular than that of the Democrats.
For the most part, however, bipartisan cooperation prevails. In
the House, which was controlled by the Democrats in 1986, the
Republicans chaired fourteen subcommittees. More importantly,
consultation between the majority and minority in the House and
Senate has worked to keep conflict minimal. In the 1986 Regular
Session, the Minority Leader and Assistant Minority Leader of the
House were part of the decision-making process on some major issues, especially taxing and spending bills. They were consulted on
the special order calendar, even during the closing days. A similar
relationship existed in the Senate. The majority leadership assisted
the minority by helping to pass their bills, obtaining floor time,
overseeing their pet projects, and consulting them on the special
order calendar. In return, the majority leadership received substantial cooperation from the Minority Leader. The mutual respect
of the parties' leaders proved to be an important ingredient of bipartisan cooperation.
C.

The Impact of Elections

The effects of electoral politics on the legislative process in Florida can be seen in the behavior of members who face severe electoral challenges. A few senators were in this position in 1986. Senator
Roberta Fox,8 for example, was under great pressure after winning
an extremely close election in 1982 and subsequently seeing her
district become 40% Hispanic and less than 50% Democratic. Although the Florida Legislature is not responsible for foreign policy
issues, she was forced to respond to such concerns when they were
expressed by her Hispanic constituents. Her behavior in the Senate changed because of the pressures of re-election. She promoted
legislation to benefit Hispanics and, on budget issues, became more
oriented to her district than even her most constituent-minded
colleagues.
87. FLA. H.R. JOUR 1149 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986) (Minority Report to Sales Tax Exemption Review, CS for HB 1307).
88. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1285 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986) (amendments 49, 57, 68 to HB 1380).
89. Dem., Coral Gables. Sen. Fox was defeated in the general election by Rep. Dexter W.
Lehtinen, Repub., Perrine.
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In 1986, the greatest impact on the legislative process stemmed
from the statewide candidacies of several senators and representatives as well as the Governor. Three legislators, Senator Harry A.
Johnston,"° who was serving as President, Senator Mann, and Representative Tom Gallagher, 9 ' were running for governor. Representative Bobby Brantley" was running for lieutenant governor. Senators Joe Gersten93 and Edgar Dunn 9 and Representative James
Watt 5 were seeking to become attorney general. Senator Betty
Castor,96 Representative Larry Hawkins, 97 and Representative Easley were in the race for commissioner of education. Governor Graham, who was constitutionally limited to two four-year terms, was
challenging incumbent Republican Paula Hawkins's for the United
States Senate. Several legislators were running for other offices.
One senator 9 was running for an open congressional seat and two
House members0 0 were competing to become mayor of Jacksonville. Even though Speaker Thompson and President Johnston
promised to keep politics to a minimum during the session, 1°0 the
perception was that with so many office-holders seeking re-election
or higher office, politics would be paramount. When asked before
the session whether politics would affect the session, Speaker
Thompson replied, "Has a cat got climbing gear?"'' 2
While electoral politics was kept within bounds, it left its mark
on the 1986 Regular Session. Members running for re-election in
close races and candidates campaigning for higher office were distracted from their legislative responsibilities. Photographers trailed
them through office building corridors, television crews wired them
for sound and filmed them on the the floor of the chamber, and
several members left Tallahassee occasionally to make quick cam90. Dem., West Palm Beach, 1974-1986.
91. Repub., Coconut Grove, 1974-1986.
92. Repub., Longwood, 1978-1986; Lieutenant Governor-elect, 1986.
93. Dem., South Miami, 1981-1986.
94. Dem., Ormond Beach, 1974-1986.
95. Repub., Lake Park, 1978-1986.
96. Dem., Tampa, 1976-1978, 1982-1986; Commissioner of Education-elect, 1986.
97. Dem., Perrine, 1978-1986.
98. United States Senator. Sen. Hawkins was defeated in the general election by Gov.
Graham.
99. Bill Grant, Dem., Madison, 1982-1986; Member of Congress-elect, 1986.
100. Rep. Thomas L. Hazouri, Dem., Jacksonville, 1974-1986; Rep. John W. Lewis,
Dem., Jacksonville, 1974-1986.
101. Thompson sees himself with all the marbles in politically charged session, Gainesville Sun, Apr. 6, 1986, at 1F, col. 2.
102. Campaigns will have big impact on session, St. Petersburg Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at
8D, col. 3.
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paign appearances. As a candidate for governor, President Johnston endured the constant tension between the goals of his campaign staff and his Senate staff. Toward the end of the session,
with Senate and House conferees in critical negotiations on the appropriations bill, he left Tallahassee for a weekend fund-raising
event. The reaction was sharp; he was taken to task and derided by
House members.
The atmosphere could not help but be affected by members
competing for statewide office. Senator Gersten attacked Senator
Dunn in radio and television advertisements, on the Senate floor,
and in committee. Whenever these two came together, other senators and the press would be distracted from the business at hand
to the personal conflict between them. The gubernatorial race
proved even more salient in its impact. Many House Republicans
supported Representative Gallagher. Many House Democrats supported former Representative Pajcic, who ultimately won the Democratic nomination but lost the general election to Republican Bob
Martinez. A contingent of Senate Democrats favored President
Johnston. He was the target for the most criticism. Throughout the
session, House members attributed electoral motives to the Senate
President for his positions on policy issues. For their part, President Johnston's supporters believed that the House leadership-in
particular, Appropriations Chairman Bell-was trying to embarrass the Senate President whenever possible. If one considers the
traditional rivalry between the House and Senate, then it is not
surprising, as one staffer commented, "No one in the House wants
to make the Senate President look good."
The issues of the 1986 Regular Session were also influenced by
electoral politics. The bills introduced, particularly President
Johnston's drunk-driving legislation, 10 3 were a reaction to opinion
surveys and the impending election. The Senate's reluctance to increase taxes for educational funding 0 4 was in part a function of
the President's candidacy and the tough re-election races facing
several Democrats. Electoral concerns also affected the Senate's initial posture-if not its subsequent action-toward tort reform and
insurance regulation.10 5
103. Ch. 86-296, 1986 Fla. Laws 2219.
104. E.g., FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 351, SB 756.
105. The Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, was a
response to increases in liability insurance in Florida. The legislature, particularly the Senate, favored regulating insurance rates over capping damage awards in personal injury suits.
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Legislative cooperation with Governor Graham, at least from the
Democrats, was affected by the United States Senate contest.
House leaders in particular wanted to challenge the Governor, but
instead exercised restraint. The Governor was at the top of the
Democratic ticket, and legislative party leaders realized that the
stronger he appeared, the better the party's members would do.
Asked whether House Democrats would help the Governor's campaign by pulling their punches, Speaker Thompson replied, "Every
chance we get.'' 06

IV.

THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

Power is one of the most intriguing features of the legislative
process. Of special interest is the exercise of power by the legislature vis-a-vis the governor and executive branch, and the distribution of power within the legislature among leaders, committees,
and members.
A.

The Legislature's Relationship with the Governor

Some years ago, it was doubtful that legislatures could ever gain
the upper hand over governors.107 But even then a number of legislatures already had control and others were achieving parity with
their governors. Today, governors dominate legislatures in only a
few states. Legislatures have been the more powerful branch of
government for some time in a few states, 108 while in most
states-Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin, for example-executive and legislative powers are balanced. In states like
New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Kentucky, where legislatures historically have been weak, they recently have asserted their
Nevertheless, several proposals were designed to reduce large awards, to cap noneconomic
damages, and to modify the doctrine of joint and several liability. For a thorough review of
these issues and their resolution, see generally Fort, Granger, Polston & Wilkes, Florida's
Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 505 (1986) (reviewing
tort changes); Schulte, Availability, Affordability, and Accountability: Regulatory Reform
of Insurance, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 557 (1986) (reviewing insurance regulation reform).
106. Graham survives session unbloodied, Florida Times-Union, June 15, 1986, at F1,
col. 5.
107. L. SABATO, GOODBYE TO GOOD-TIME CHARLIE: THE AMERICAN GOVERNOR TRANSFORMED, 1950-1975, at 83 (1978).
108. Arizona, Mississippi, South Carolina. See Rosenthal, Legislative Oversight and the
Balance of Power in State Government, 56 STATE GOV'T 90, 91 (1983).
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power. Recently, legislatures and governors have been vying for
control. 10 9
Constitutionally, the governor of Florida is at a disadvantage.
According to one assessment of "formal authority," the chief executive in Florida ranks in the lowest category, with Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Texas."0 According to another assessment,
the chief executive in Florida ranks in the moderate range on "formal authority," equal to twenty other states, weaker than twentythree, and stronger than six."' The Florida Constitution limits the
governor's powers mainly by the unique Cabinet system, whose
members are elected statewide and who decide many matters collectively. In earlier years, the principal power in the state lay in
the Cabinet. In the era of biennial legislative sessions, "there was a
great sigh of relief in Tallahassee when the Legislature went home
and the Cabinet then proceeded to administer the government
with the general acquiescence of the Governor for the next two
years.""' 2 In 1968, Florida revised its constitution and strength3
ened both the legislature and Cabinet."
During the last two decades, Florida has made the transition to
legislative government. Today Florida has one of the strongest legislatures in the nation. The legislature leaves its imprint on just
about everything of consequence in Florida government. Major initiatives originate in the legislature, although executive departments, agencies, and the governor's staff also are productive. The
legislature takes responsibility for mediating among rival interests,
building a consensus, shaping the product, and getting a bill
passed and ready for the governor's signature. It does not depend
upon, nor does it take kindly to, leadership from the governor or
anyone else. In Florida, the legislature regards itself as the leader.
109. See Simon, Legislatures and Governors: The Wrestling Match, 59 STATE GOV'T 1,
1-6 (1986).
110. This categorization is based on tenure potential, control over other major state offices, administrative appointments, budget authority, and veto power. A. ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE 235-38 (1981).
111. This categorization is based on tenure potential, and appointment, budget, organization, and veto powers. Beyle, Governors, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 193-203,
454-59 (4th ed. 1983).
112. Remarks of Robert Mann, Florida Senate Seminar, Legislative Reform in Historic
Context, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Jan. 11, 1985) (unedited transcript) (on file with Senate
President's office).
113. In 1978, a proposed constitutional amendment that would have abolished the
elected Cabinet was defeated almost three to one. THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1985-86, at 593
(A. Morris ed. 1985).
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Nevertheless, the power of the governor, whatever the limitations of the office, cannot be discounted. If the governor is personally assertive, programmatically inclined, politically skillful, and
adept at public relations, he will have substantial influence. The
past two governors, Reubin Askew and Bob Graham, have had
these characteristics and thus provided strong leadership. They influenced the formulation of policy, the budget, administration of
laws, and implementation of programs.
The legislature is not only independent of the governor but aggressive in its relationship to him. During Governor Graham's tenure it has been conscious of its prerogatives, confident in its power,
and ready for an occasional battle. The legislature's willingness to
engage in political combat-and its apparent delight from it-may
be attributable in part to the peculiar chemistry between Governor
Graham and key legislators. In dealing with legislators, the Governor frequently has stood on principle-though his behavior could
be as political as theirs-which has rankled some members. He
also has been criticized for taking credit for programs that relied
heavily on legislators for their support, for seeming to agree with
legislators while actually disagreeing, for having overly ambitious
goals, for ignoring his allies, for being unwilling
to compromise,
11 4
and for being a rather distant "cold fish.
Governor Graham's legislative programs may or may not prove
successful, but he has been an effective leader. Because of his popularity and adroit use of the press to appeal to the people, the legislature had to take the Governor's initiatives seriously. It did not,
however, take them as gospel; some it turned down, others were
overhauled, and the remainder were modified.
The annual budget records the comparative power of the two
branches. The governor presents his recommended budget to the
legislature in February. The process of deciding appropriations issues is then vested in the legislature. The Senate and House Appropriations Committees put together appropriations bills through
a laborious process-agreeing first on the funding for continuing
operations, then considering new or expanded programs. The governor's priorities receive consideration, but the favor of Senate and
House is with priorities determined by the, legislative leadership,
the Appropriations Committees and the subcommittees. As the
114. "The Wimp" proved people wrong, Gainesville Sun, May 11, 1986, at 1B, col. 2;
Voters close to Graham-legislatorsdon't understand, Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 30, 1986, at
A12, col. 4.

420

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:399

1986 Regular Session commenced, the Governor's legislative lobbyist noted that Graham had three main priorities: "budget, budget,
budget."'11 5 Yet, the Governor's budgetary priorities-his preference for more spending on social programs and higher cigarette
taxes, as well as particular funding levels for specific purposes-were generally disregarded by lawmakers.
The legislature has several devices for exerting control over executive branch operations through the budget. For example, the "letter of intent" that accompanies the appropriations bill directs
agencies in the spending of appropriated funds. In 1986, one issue
that arose was whether the letter of intent could be used to erode
the governor's line-item veto power. In 1985, Governor Graham vetoed several projects in the Public Education Capital Outlay
(PECO) bill." 6 The House challenged the vetoes in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the Florida Constitution limited the
governor to using the line-item veto only for "general appropriations bills." The court held that, for purposes of the line-item veto
power, the PECO bill was a general appropriations bill." 7 In an
attempt to circumvent the court's decision, the legislature in 1986
included funds for a large number of projects in one line-item of
the appropriations bill, then used the letter of intent to specify on
which projects the money should be spent. Governor Graham did
not take up the challenge.
A governor's veto power is an ever-present concern among legislators. "The most direct power the governor can exercise vis-a-vis
the legislature is the use or threat to use the veto.""" The threat
that he will veto a legislator's bill or the appropriation for his pet
project encourages members to cooperate. Alternatively, when a
veto is a possibility, the hint that the governor will sign a member's bill or let his project stand can buy good will. Although Governor Graham normally has been reluctant to make deals for his
own priorities, he has done so on occasion. The veto is used not
only to forward the governor's programs, but also to block legislative action with which the governor disagrees. The legislature does
not contest most gubernatorial vetoes. Some vetoes are sustained,
115. Graham survives session unbloodied, Florida Times-Union, June 15, 1986, at F5,
col 1.
116. Ch. 85-275, 1986 Fla. Laws 2022; FLA. H.R. JOUR. 205 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 30, 1986)
(veto message); see also FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 8, 9 (governor's line-item veto power).
117. Thompson v. Graham, 481 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1985).
118. Beyle, The Governor as Chief Legislator, in BEING GOVERNOR-THE VIEW FROM THE
OFFICE 137 (T. Beyle & L. Muchmore eds. 1983); see also Simon, supra note 109, at 4-5.
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most recently, the veto of a 1985 bill that would have relaxed
handgun licensing requirements,'1 9 and some are overridden, such
as Governor Graham's veto of the PECO bill in 1984.
Governor Graham has been undeterred by the prospect of legislative overrides and believes: "It's the Governor's job to veto, if he
feels it necessary. It's the Legislature's job to override, if they feel
it necessary. I'll do my job and let them do theirs. 1 20 With a new
governor entering office in January 1987, the relationship between
the governor and the Florida Legislature probably .will change.
Nevertheless, the Florida Legislature will continue to be strong, independent, and aggressive toward the governor, no matter who
holds the office.
B.

The Power of Legislative Leaders

The strength of the Florida Legislature's leadership partially explains its aggressive posture; in few states do senate presidents (or
majority leaders) and house speakers exert leadership as forcefully
as in Florida. Indeed, one former member has commented that
Florida has as much, or more, power concentrated in its leaders as
any other state. 21 The president in Massachusetts, the majority
leader in New York, and the speakers in Colorado, Maine, New
York, Ohio, and Texas wield power similar to Florida's

leadership. 122
Most states have witnessed a gradual decline in the power of legislative leaders because members are less willing to. be led. New
leadership styles, based more on consensus-building than command, are emerging in many states. 2 3 Florida has seen such an
emergence of this style, with both Senate and House leaders building consensus through skillful use of resources and working from
positions of strength.
119. FLA. S. JOUR. 135-36 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 22, 1986) (sustaining veto of SB 661) (1985)).
120. Interview with Jill Chamberlain, Press Secretary to Governor Graham (Jan. 30,
1986) (notes on file with the author).
121. Remarks of United States Representative Kenneth H. MacKay, Florida Senate
Seminar, Legislative Reform in Historic Context, in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Jan. 11, 1985)
(unedited transcript) (on file with Senate President's office).
122. For an account of strong leadership, see Francis & Riddlesperger, U.S. State Legislative Committees: Structure, ProceduralEfficiency, and Party Control, 7 LEG. STUD. Q. 453
(1982); Pitney, Leaders and Rules in the New York State Senate, 7 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 491
(1982).
123. See Wunnicke & Randall, Leadership 1980s Style, STATE LEGISLATURES, July 1986,
at 26-29.
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One notable constraint on Florida's leaders is the regular rota-

tion of leadership. Traditionally, a new president and speaker take
office at the biennial organizational session after each general election. That tradition has been broken only once in modern times.124
Unsuccessful efforts have been made to change the system, most
notably by former Speaker Richard Pettigrew.125
Rotating leadership is advantageous in that it results in a circulation of members in key positions. Because no one can hold power
too long, any possible abuse is limited. More importantly, younger
members have a chance to attain the highest leadership office in
their legislative body. Perhaps this openness to new leaders explains the high quality of leadership in Florida.
These advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages of rotation, most notably the discontinuity of leadership. Because pledges
of support are collected years in advance, future leaders are likely
to spend years on the "leadership team" before becoming speaker
or president. 26 Even so, no job is comparable with speaker or president; there is no substitute for firsthand experience in the top
leadership position. It takes time to learn and, unfortunately, by
the time one gets a sense of the job he is on the way out. A president's or speaker's power starts to ebb at the outset of his term,
soon after committee chairmen are appointed. It plummets after
his successor has been designated the following May, and it disintegrates at the conclusion of his second legislative session.
Rotating leadership also results in a discontinuity of policy. New
leaders usually have new programs they want enacted, partially as
monuments to their tenure. Few want merely to consolidate programs of predecessors; that is not the way to leave one's mark.
Consequently, some legislative policies are always changing. Education, for example, has seen major new programs almost every two
years, going back at least as far as a general revision of the school
124. Rep. Donald Tucker, Dem., Tallahassee, 1966-1978, served as speaker in 1975-76
and 1977-78. One Senate President, Sen. W.D. Childers, Dem., Pensacola, attempted to succeed himself in 1982, but was blocked by a bipartisan coalition.
125. See Pettigrew & Rhodes, The Case for a Re-electable Speaker, FLORIDA STATE
UNIV., GOVT'L RESEARCH BULL., Mar., 1972.
126. As of this writing, the. House speaker for 1987-88 (Rep. Jon Mills, Dem., Gainesville), 1989-90 (Rep. Tom Gustafson, Dem., Ft. Lauderdale), and 1991-92 (Rep. Bell) appear
to have been selected. The 1993-94 decision is not far off. Although the 1987-88 Senate
president was purportedly chosen last year in the Senate Democratic caucus (Sen. Ken
Jenne, Dem., Hollywood), a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans elected
Sen. John Vogt, Dem., Cocoa Beach, as president during the November organization session.
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code in 1972,27 and extending through the 1983 and 1984 educational reform legislation. 2 8 A former speaker vividly described his
two years in office as "a brief window
of opportunity, but you have
12 9
gorilla.
300-pound
a
of
the power
Legislative power springs from many sources, including the
leader's ability to appoint and remove committee chairmen and
members, to set the special order calendar for consideration of bills
on the floor, to play a major role in setting budget priorities, to
refer bills to committees, to control the professional staff, and to
accord recognition to members in various ways, enhancing their
political reputations. Further, the president and the speaker are
effective because leadership is respected by the membership: legislators acknowledge that leadership is the key to the whole process.
They want, and expect, strong leadership.
The president and speaker lead by delegation, inclusion, and reward, not raw authority. Much influence is given to standing committees and their chairmen. Because they are part of the "leadership team," committee chairmen have a relatively free hand with
issues-except, of course, for leadership priorities. In the 1986 Regular Session, for example, Speaker Thompson's team included approximately twenty-five members. Within that team a smaller
group was frequently consulted on policy and strategy. An even
smaller core was in on everything. President Johnston's team included about ten senators, most of whom regularly participated in
decisions. Inclusion goes beyond the team concept, however. Leaders try to include as many members as possible so members will
have a stake in, and thus support, the leadership position.
Finally, leaders try to maintain influence by helping members.
Such help includes saying "yes" to their requests, assisting them
with pet bills, providing a "turkey" or two, supporting their districts on appropriations issues, mobilizing support and raising
funds for their campaigns, and dispensing lesser favors.
Consequently, leaders incur debts and build loyalty. On tough
issues they must try to build consensus. Hence, they must carefully
choose the issues on which they want to lead, remain within the
bounds set by membership preferences, count heads and persuade
members, and engage in deals and trades as necessary.
127. E.g., ch. 72-221, 1972 Fla. Laws 658.
128. E.g., ch. 83-327, 1983 Fla. Laws 2120; ch. 83-348, 1983 Fla. Laws 2318; ch. 84-336,
1984 Fla. Laws 1817.
129. Interview with H. Lee Moffitt, former Speaker of the Florida House (Feb. 6, 1986)
(notes on file with the author).
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Overall, because of its size, the House is more tightly organized
and more manageable than the Senate. Leadership is stronger
there. The Senate has more experienced and individualistic members who constrain strong leadership. At any particular time, however, a president's or speaker's strength depends in part on his own
philosophy and approach to leadership, and on his personal skill.
V. THE NATURE OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Much of the discussion of the legislative process per se (the
route by which a bill does or does not become law) focuses on efficiency. Legislators and others are often interested in devices such
as time-saving techniques, deadline systems, limitations on bill introductions, and committee scheduling.' Although these matters
are important, other key questions about process are seldom addressed. These questions concern how the session's agenda is established, what type of scrutiny bills receive, what methods of negotiation and bargaining are employed, and the patterns of
settlement that prevail.
A.

The Formal Process of Lawmaking

The legislative agenda is determined by the members of the Senate and House whose bill introductions constitute the session's
business. Historically, Florida has been among the nation's leaders
in the number of bills introduced. From 1963 to 1974, Florida averaged more than 6,000 introductions each biennium, a number of
which were similar or identical "companion" bills filed in the opposite chamber.' 3' Only California, Massachusetts, and New York averaged more. Florida's introductions have declined recently. With
about 5,050 bills introduced in 1983-84, Florida fell far behind
New York (more than 33,000), Massachusetts (nearly 18,000), and
New Jersey (more than 7,500), and slightly behind California, Illinois, Louisiana, and Maryland.,

2

The most recent data show only

33
a 10% increase from the 1983-84 biennium.1
Nearly a third of all bills introduced focus on special interests.
Such bills are advanced by a group wanting to use governmental

130. See, e.g., Carpenter, New Rules, Procedures: Speeding up the Process, STATE LEGISLATURES, July, 1986, at 19.
131. Rosenthal & Forth, There Ought to be a Law!, 51 STATE Gov'T 81, 82 (1978).
132. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 10, at 114-20.
133. FLA. LEGIs., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1985 REGULAR SESSION, STATISTICS REPORT 1
(statistic sheet for bills).
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authority to promote its professional, occupational, or economic interests. Another third are "agency bills," containing the legislative
programs of executive branch departments and agencies. Most of
these concern noncontroversial matters of administration, organization, and implementation.
The final third come from various sources. The appropriations
bill, the most important bill in the process, is required by law."'
"Sunset" provisions, providing for the termination of a law unless
reauthorizing legislation is enacted, spur others. Federal mandates
sometimes precipitate bills, such as legislation enabling the state to
qualify for federal funds. Court decisions also prompt legislation.
In addition, there are local bills needed by specific communities,
bills that respond to complaints made by constituents, and bills
designed by legislative, county, and municipal officials to promote
district interests. Many bills result after studies conducted by
standing committees, special committees, and commissions. There
are also bills to carry out the governor's and legislative leaders'
program objectives.
Senate and House standing committees scrutinize many of these
bills. They narrow the issues and can amend or modify bills. Even
with preparatory work during the interim it is impossible thoroughly to scrutinize every bill. Many, however, are companion bills,
similar or identical in the two chambers. Many have been through
the process before and have become familiar to members.
Formal review begins with a bill analysis by the committee staff,
which analysis then serves as a basic document for members.
Whether the chairman puts the bill on the agenda is critical to its
survival. If he does, the bill will undoubtedly be reported favorably, although not necessarily in its original form. During the 1986
Regular Session, for example, of the 2,456 referrals to Senate committees, 1,251 were placed on the agenda.13 Of these, 1,226 were
reported favorably and only 25 unfavorably. Of the 2,143 referrals
to House committees, 925 were placed on the agenda. Of these, 911
were reported favorably and only 14 unfavorably. It should be
noted, however, that a substantial number of the Senate and
House referrals were the same bills and had been assigned to two,
or sometimes three, committees. For instance, most of the 367 bills
referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee and the 651 bills
134. FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 8, 12.
135. Fla. Legis., Jt. Legis. Mgmt. Comm., Legis. Info. Div., computer printout (Oct. 7,
1986) (printout on file with committee).
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referred to the House Appropriations Committee had first been
considered in other committees.
A bill on the agenda gets a hearing in committee. The sponsor
can present the bill, witnesses can testify in support or opposition
to it, and committee members can discuss it, amend it, and substitute a committee version for it. Members will not kill it, however.
If they are unsympathetic to a colleague's bill, they will pass it on,
expecting it to die somewhere else. Chances are that it will be buried in the Appropriations Committee, where bills with likely fiscal
impact must be reviewed. The two Appropriations Committees are
more stringent than the rest. Senate Approprations favorably reports only 23% of the bills referred to it compared to 50% for Senate standing committees. House Appropriations favorably reports
only 27% compared to 43% for House standing committees.
Bills that negotiate passage through one house do not always undergo comparable scrutiny in the other chamber. Often companion
or similar bills find their way through the Senate and House simultaneously. Sometimes bills passed in one chamber go right to the
floor in the other. In a few instances, bills do not receive committee
scrutiny in either chamber because House bills can be referred directly to the calendar by the presiding officer.
Although the substantive committees and the Appropriations
Committees are primarily responsible for the formal scrutiny of
legislation, others also take part. The Rules Committee of each
chamber reviews bills for placement on the special order calendar,
in effect deciding which bills receive action on the floor and which
languish on the second reading calendar. With so many bills being
reported favorably by committees, the Rules Committee has the
critical job of managing the flow to the floor. Its job is even more
critical late in the session, when committee chairmen permit sponsors to withdraw bills and seek positions on the special order calendar. In the 1986 Regular Session, for example, one out of five
bills in Senate committees and almost three out of ten bills in
House committees were withdrawn. Thus, fewer than one-third of
referred bills die in committees. Most of the remainder find their
way to the Rules Committee, which comes under greater pressure
to let bills reach the floor as the session nears its end.
The special order calendar determines which bills will be heard
on the floor and in what order. Virtually all bills that make it to
the floor pass, although some are altered. Action on the floor does
not necessarily entail scrutiny because most bills are processed
rapidly, without debate or amendment. But some, perhaps one in
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ten, provoke discussion and amendment on the floor. Contrary to
the belief that legislators are unfamiliar with most of the bills on
which they vote, most members of the Senate and House are generally familiar with the overwhelming number of issues they consider. They have seen many of these issues in previous sessions,
attended to some during committee meetings, been briefed by
aides on others, and have discussed informally a large number of
them with colleagues and lobbyists.
B.

The Informal Process of Lawmaking

The informal process of legislating is important but fluid and
difficult to specify. It begins before a bill's introduction, when
groundwork is laid and sponsors are recruited, and runs through
the bill's enactment and signing by the governor. It takes place in
leadership suites, members' offices, the corridors of the Senate and
House, in committee, on the floor, and at the many receptions held
by interest groups. In this process legislators and lobbyists frequently interact, mobilizing support, developing strategy, exchanging information, and reinforcing each other. Most interactions occur among allies who share values or interests and either support
or oppose a particular proposal. Some interactions, however, are
between parties with conflicting interests who, under legislative
auspices, come together to negotiate and reach agreements. This is
how consensus, toward which the legislature strives, is developed.
Plans are put together informally so that much of what goes on
in committee and on the floor has been scripted in advance. Most
informal work is merely ratified in the formal setting, but occasionally there is a breakdown in subcommittee, committee, or on the
floor. It is then necessary for key participants to meet in the small
conference rooms (or "bubbles") at the rear of the Senate and
House chambers, the members' lounges, the president's or
speaker's conference room, or anywhere they can expeditiously get
together to rebuild their coalition and reshape their agreement.
The formal and informal processes overlap and reinforce one another. Each is necessary for the legislature's functioning. Despite
relatively permissive committees, the system works overall. It
probably works most effectively on major issues, where the leadership is committed, and less effectively on minor bills and specialinterest issues, where decision-making is more decentralized.
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The End-of-Session Logjam

At the close of the session, the system buckles under the pressures of workload, controversy, and rivalry. 3 6 A large proportion of
business on the floor takes place at the very end of the sixty-day
session. In 1986, for instance, 40% of the bills that passed the Senate did so during the last three days and 23 % passed on the last
day. In the House, 36% passed during the last three days and 20%
passed on the last day.13 7 It is not only that many bills do not
reach the floor until the end, but the leadership deliberately
postpones final action on some of the toughest issues until the
deadline for adjournment forces contestants to resolve their differences. It is during the last week that a Senate-House conference
committee tries to reach a consensus on the appropriations bill.
The appropriations conference report is not accepted, nor is the
bill passed, until the very end. This enables the leaders to maintain control over the members by virtue of their control over the
members' pet projects. Conference committees also settle other
outstanding major issues in the waning hours.
Most bills do not go to conference. Rather, in the last few days
they travel back and forth from House to Senate, picking up and
shedding provisions. For a bill to be enacted, the Senate and
House versions must be identical. This is not easy, given the policy
differences and the roles of lobbyists in supporting one chamber or
the other. It is made even more difficult by the traditional rivalry
between the House and Senate, which is more intense in Florida
than most other states. Both sides are resourceful in their negotiations and unwilling to settle until time is about to run out.
To further complicate matters, during the last week of the session members connect different bills, constructing what are known
as "trains." A train, or omnibus bill, usually covers a single general
subject, but may combine more than a dozen separately introduced
pieces of legislation. The object is protection. A member's pet bill
may be attached to "must-pass" legislation that has considerable
support. Similarly, a bill the governor opposes may be linked to
bills that the governor cannot afford to veto.
The end of the session undermines, at least to some extent, the
committee process. Bills that would otherwise die are withdrawn
136. Such end-of-session difficulties exist in most states. See Tucker, Legislative Logjams: A Comparative State Analysis, 38 W. POL. Q. 432 (1985).
137. The session was extended three hours, so it ended not on the last regular day, June
6, but at 3 a.m. on June 7. FLA. S. JOUR. 1092 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986) (vote on HJR 1433).
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from a committee, with the chairman's permission, as sponsors or
lobbyists try to get them to a more favorable committee or to the
special order calendar. Even if a bill has not been withdrawn, as
long as the committee has not voted it down it can be introduced
as an amendment to another bill. It then has a chance of being
linked to one of the trains and steaming through to enactment during the last-minute confusion. Resurrecting a bill in this manner is
the moment of truth for those members and lobbyists who delight
in the game of legislative legerdemain. It also suggests that the
committee system needs shoring up.' 3s
Despite the frenzy of the end-of-the-session rush, the leaders
maintain surprising control. Indeed, leaders have more of a role
than would appear from the floor. Until the very end the major
feature of the settlement process is the ability of leaders to manage, even though they cannot dictate every outcome. Over the
course of the session leaders are very successful in structuring settlements. Their policy views, however, do not always prevail. The
more ideological or philosophical the issue, the more unpredictable
the outcome.
The process is leadership-centered. Others, however, play significant roles. The Appropriations Committees and their subcommittees wield substantial influence, and other standing committees,
particularly those with jurisdiction over economic and regulatory
matters, are delegated many issues including most of the special
interest concerns. Nor are individual members shut out. Those
with entrepreneurial and subject-matter skills can be key players
on disparate issues. The governor is a major force, and executive
agencies are critical within their own spheres.
Finally, lobbyists representing a myriad of interests are engaged
in the resolution of practically every issue. The short session and
the intense nature of the Capitol community throw legislators and
lobbyists together. Thus, their relationships in Tallahassee are
closer than those in other state capitals. In most cases, legislators
work with lobbyists not out of dependency but because they want
to. As a result of political philosophy, experience, or constituency,
legislators and lobbyists share particular interests and consider
138. Leaders and members agree on the need to improve the system but seem unable to
do much. In his opening address to the Senate, President Johnston urged committees to be
tougher in reviewing bills. "I do not want bad ideas to be left hanging around as possible
amendments when floor work picks up in May," he said. "So I can't emphasize strongly
enough that your job is not only to pass good bills, but to kill bad ones." FLA. S. JOUR. 3
(Reg. Sess. Apr. 8, 1986).
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themselves allies on certain issues. Campaign contributions reinforce the alliance, but seldom create it.1 s9
VI.

CONCLUSION:

THE

QUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE

The performance of a legislature depends on capacity, membership, power, politics, and process. The Florida Legislature performs well because legislative capacity has been developed and is
productively used, individual legislators are remarkably talented,
and internal power is sufficiently concentrated for the legislature
to lead the state. The legislative process is, however, flawed. Although we can hardly expect perfection in a process that is representative, democratic, and beset with conflict, the lawmaking process can be improved in Florida.
First, legislative leaders and committee chairmen can say "no"
to members more often. They can kill poor bills rather than pass
them on, hoping they will die elsewhere. Second, some of the major
issues and more of the minor ones can be resolved earlier so that
the end-of-the-session agenda is more manageable and is handled
more deliberatively. Third, leaders can keep the "trains" shorter
and slower, so they do not become vehicles for bills of dubious kinship and questionable quality. Fourth, in order to dispel suspicion
and promote cooperation, communication between Senate and
House leaders should be increased as the session progresses, not
just in the crunch of the closing days. Fifth, rivalry between the
Senate and the House can be restrained.
Most importantly, throughout the process the legislative eye
must be kept on the prevailing public policy. During the course of
a session, legislators often become preoccupied with the politics of
enacting legislation. This is understandable because they are busy
fashioning support, overcoming opposition, and negotiating measures through the Senate and House. But in the heady game of
lawmaking, legislators may lose sight of their ultimate public policy objectives. They pay too little attention to issues of funding,
implementation, and the question of how (and whether) the bill
they are so vigorously trying to enact will work. Often, exceedingly
ambitious programs are modestly funded and frequently do not
work as intended.
139. The inference that lobbyists call the shots and legislators serve as their
handmaidens in return for campaign contributions, free meals, and other favors is incorrect.
Although some legislators do the bidding of lobbyists in certain instances-and money is
doubtless important in politics-for the most part integrity is not impeached.
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On balance, Florida can take pride in its legislature. If the purpose of a legislature is to represent people and groups, to provide a
deliberative process by which conflict can take place and consensus
built, and to produce outcomes that further the overall interests of
the state, then the Florida Legislature does its job well. It ranks
among the nation's best.

